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Affidavit and Supporting Documentation 7/27/01
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226. Mr. Kovel was told that it was very unlikely that the
Appellate Division would grant the relief sought, as the Court was
really only able to work with an existing record, and that it was not a
trial court that could decide new facts. Mr. Kovel may have been told
that the Court could not even take the case in this posture without an
aggrieved appellant. The Clerk suggested that I make the motion to the
Supreme Court, which has the ability to change the record.

227. I followed that advice.

228. The papers addressed to the Appellate Division were made
over into a motion to the equitable distribution trial judge, Justice
Simeon Golar. At that time J.H.O. Modugno was no longer on the

229. Justice Golar denied the motion. He found that it was
untimely, that the "newly discovered" evidence offered was not in law
"newly discovered", and that in any event the evidence offered was
insufficient to show fraud on the court and the relief sought was for the
most part addressed to the Appellate Division's affirmance of the trial
court order- and was thus not "within the purview of this court to

230. Justice Golar thus clearly implied that only the Appellate
Division could review its own findings.

231. The apparent Catch 22 thus necessitated appeal of Justice
Golar's decision and order to the Appellate Division for the relief

232. I am presently collaterally estopped from denying that my
appeal from the Supreme Court's order of
March 26, 1997 was
without merit, and was undertaken for the purpose of harassing and
maliciously injuring the opposing party.

233. This Court has determined that I am collaterally estopped
from denying that my taking the appeal constituted conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice.

234. My reasons for bringing the motion and for taking the appeal
are fully set out in the motion and appellate papers themselves (a copy
of the motion and of my appellate brief are attached hereto and
marked Exhibit "A"), as well as in my Affidavit in Opposition to the
Imposition of Sanctions, and Reply Affidavit,

dated June 9, 1998 and June 11, 1998 respectively submitted to the
Appellate Division. (True copies of those documents are attached
hereto and marked Exhibits "B" and "C" respectively).

235. My perception of the motion and of the appeal was and is that
they were aimed solely at clearing my good name.

236. Despite the view taken of my action by the Appellate
Division, I viewed my action in the circumstances I have described.

237. I submit that no prejudice to the administration of justice can be
found here.29 Certainly it is the function of the courts to effect a just
resolution of differences. The Appellate Division viewed my attempt
to clear my name, which I believe was unjustly tarnished, as without a
"concrete motivation". Absent a "concrete motivation" the Court
concluded that "this appeal can only

have been intended to harass the defendant (Esther)... by needlessly
forcing her to incur attorneys fees".

238. I was sanctioned $10,000.00, paid to the Lawyers' Fund for
Client Protection, for bringing the appeal.

239. I submit that a rational analysis of the events leads to the
inevitable conclusion that any prejudice to the administration of
justice has been redressed.

240. I believe, however, that charges Three and Four of the Petition
herein have no rationally just origin. I believe that they were brought
for the improper purpose of silencing my opposition to Emmerich
Handler's very real abuse of the judicial process. I will here attempt
to establish this through my own testimony, with or without that of
Emmerich Handler, Robert Saltzman, Esq. and Susan Korenberg, Esq.




Emmerich Handler's Influence In Kings County

and The Motive For These

Proceedings Is Evidenced By The Grievance

Committee's Failure To Pursue

His Very Serious Disciplinary Rule Violations

Despite The Committee's Knowledge Of Them


241. I have endeavored to keep the Grievance Committee informed
of Emmerich Handler's numerous and very serious breaches of the
disciplinary rules of this jurisdiction.

242. I believe that the Grievance Committee has taken no action in
this regard.

243. I believe that the reason for this is not laudable. I believe that

Emmerich Handler has exercised influence in Kings County to avoid
the just consequences of his actions.

244. I have cooperated fully with the Grievance Committee in
explaining my actions and in exposing the fabrication of lawsuits and
the subornation of perjury attendant on the
Walker v. Weinstock
lawsuit in
Nassau County and the Walker, Handler and Kaminetzer
Yeshiva of
Jerusalem v. Weinstock lawsuit in Kings County.

245. In my complaint of April 17, 1995 I informed the Grievance
Committee of the ongoing fraud, perjury and subornation of perjury
conducted by Emmerich Handler and his attorneys, as well as the
breach of escrow by Emmerich Handler's attorney George Weisz,
Esq. of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton in connection with the
latter lawsuit.

246. I was advised by letter from the Grievance that its policy is
not to process matters where civil litigation is ongoing.

247. To date I am unaware of any action taken with respect to
Emmerich Handler.

248. By contrast, I was asked to respond to complaints of Jack
Walker and Emmerich Handler long before the conclusion of civil
litigation in the matters.

249. In response to the request of counsel to the Grievance
Committee I provided counsel with each and every document

250. Despite the various assurances made by counsel for the
Grievance Committee that I would be heard respecting Emmerich
Handler's role in the litigation giving rise to Charges One and Two
herein, I have had no such opportunity.

251. I have been given no opportunity in these proceedings to date
to address the facts surrounding my appeal in the matter of Weinstock
v. Weinstock. That appeal underlies Charges Three and Four in this
matter. Those facts are addressed herein, largely by way of attachment
of my affirmations of
June 9, 1998 and June 11, 1998 (Exhibits "B"
and "C" hereto) submitted to the court in response to its order to show
cause why I should not be sanctioned for taking that appeal.

252. Without challenging this court's findings respecting that
appeal, I submit that my action in taking that appeal does not require
that I be disciplined, just as other attorneys, like me found to have
taken frivolous actions, have neither been pursued nor disciplined. I
believe that that I have been improperly singled out

for this treatment, and I believe that the facts presented here prove

253. I believe that Emmerich Handler exercises influence in Kings

254. I believe that Emmerich Handler, Jack Walker, Robert
Saltzman, Esq. and Susan Korenberg, Esq. possess evidence in this
regard, and that were they to testify in this matter that fact would
surely be established.






255. The circumstances surrounding the appellate proceedings
which resulted in the "findings" that I filed an appeal maliciously and
that I practiced coercion and over-reaching, as well as the
circumstances under which the instant Petition was brought, evidence
a corrupt motive for prosecution of these proceedings.

256. That motive is the desire of my adversary Emmerich Handler
to dissuade me from enforcing my two judgments against him, and the
desire of Emmerich Handler and others to preclude me from exposing
the frauds perpetrated against me by Handler and his attorneys.

257. That motive is wholly unrelated to any legitimate objective.

258. That motive, which underlies the selective prosecution of me
among all attorneys sanctioned by the courts of this state under
NYCRR Part 130, makes of this proceeding a violation of my
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws as
enunciated in cases such as Village of Willowbrook v. Olech 120 S.
Ct. 1073, 528 U.S. 1073 (2000), City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985), Latrieste Restaurant & Cabaret,
Inc. v. Village of Portchester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994), .and
Lisa's Party City, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F. 3d, 12, 17 (2d Cir.

259. For the foregoing reasons, and in the interest of justice, I
respectfully submit that the only recommendation appropriate to
Special Referee the Honorable Albert A. Blinder upon the instant
hearing in mitigation in this proceeding is that no disciplinary action
be taken. The public needs no protection from me.



Dated: July 27, 2001

Belle Harbor, New York




Israel Weinstock, Esq.

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